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Abstract: This article considers the increasing tendency for states to introduce 
criminal cartel regimes and notes that, despite this tendency, few jurisdictions, aside 
from the US, have been successful in imprisoning individuals involved in cartel 
conduct. The article examines why this might be, focussing on the difficulties and 
problems that have been encountered with the criminal cartel offence in the UK. The 
article discusses both theoretical and practical obstacles which appear, up until now, 
to have undermined the force and effectiveness of the UK regime and led to concerns 
about its scope. Given the difficulties identified, the article concludes that caution 
should be exercised before a state, intent on increasing deterrents to cartel activity, 
decides to criminalise such conduct. Rather, it recommends that such jurisdictions 
should consider not only criminalisation of cartel activity but whether steps to 
enhance civil enforcement might be a preferable and more efficient solution for 
increasing the force of, and respect for, cartel rules.  
Keywords: cartels, deterrence, criminal law, Article 101, Competition Act 1998, 
Enterprise Act 2002, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, enforcement policy 
JEL Codes: K21, L40 and L41 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s there has been growing international acceptance that ‘hardcore’ cartel 
activity
1
 poses a serious threat to economies and consumers and constitutes ‘the 
supreme evil of antitrust’2 and ‘the most egregious’3 violation of competition law. 
Most antitrust systems now clearly prohibit cartel activity, treating it as an ‘automatic’ 
violation of the rules.
4
 As consensus over the economic harm
5
 caused by cartels and 
the need for clear rules prohibiting them has strengthened, debate has focused on the 
question of how best to reflect the seriousness of the offence, how to combat cartel 
activity and how to ensure that it is detected, deterred and punished.
6
  
In section 2 of this article it is seen that international initiatives and greater 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation between competition authorities have 
significantly contributed to the dramatic shift in perceptions of, and attitudes towards, 
cartels and to a ‘global trend toward enhanced sanctions combined with common 
enforcement techniques’.7 Although this international convergence is occurring 
through a variety of legal techniques, which reflect the different histories and the 
diverse political, cultural and economic factors which have shaped the development of 
competition law and policy in each jurisdiction, ‘[a] truly global effort against hard 
core cartels has emerged’.8 Around the world sanctions for those involved in cartel 
conduct have been mounting, leniency regimes are commonly being utilised as an 
important anti-cartel enforcement tool serving to destabilise cartels and encouraging a 
 
1
  Broadly anti-competitive arrangements between competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids 
(collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets, OECD 
Publication, ‘Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective action Against Hard Core 
Cartels’ C(98)35/FINAL, of May 1998.  
2
  Verizon Communications v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, (2004) 540 U.S. 398, 408. See eg, 
‘Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead’ (OECD, 2003), and M. 
Monti, ‘Fighting Cartels Why and How? Why should we be concerned with cartels and collusive 
behaviour?’ 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference, Stockholm, 11–12 Sept. 2000. 
3
  OECD Publication C(98)35/FINAL, n 1. 
4
  In the US, for example, cartel arrangements are, because of their pernicious effect on competition 
and lack of any redeeming virtue, considered to be illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act of 1890, Northern Pac R Co v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958).  Similarly, in the EU, cartels 
are presumed to violate Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the 
‘TFEU’) – they automatically infringe Article 101(1) – restrict competition by object – and, being 
naked, are incapable of satisfying the conditions for the legal exception set out in Article 101(3). 
5
  See further nn 11-14 and surrounding text. 
6
  Although enforcement by private individuals in civil proceedings may also deter violations this 
article focuses on public enforcement.  
7
  See eg, GC Shaffer and NH Nesbitt, ‘Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?’ University of 
Minnesota Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-26, 3. 
8
  ICN Cartels Working Group ‘Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective 
Penalties’(2005), 5. 
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‘race to confess’, and criminal cartel regimes are burgeoning.9 Despite the rapidly 
increasing number of criminal cartel regimes, however, few jurisdictions, aside from 
the US, have been successful in imprisoning individuals involved in cartel conduct. 
This article considers why this might be, focussing on the difficulties and problems 
that have been encountered in the UK where a criminal cartel offence was enacted in 
2002 (and amended and reformed in 2013).  
Sections 3 and 4 discuss theoretical and practical obstacles which appear, up until 
now, to have undermined the force and effectiveness of the UK criminal cartel regime 
and led to concerns about its scope. Section 3 sets out the view that, although it is 
arguably tempting, as the UK Government has done, to use the criminal law as a form 
of preference-shaping disincentive to deter violations of anti-cartel rules, this 
approach does not consider whether there are any inherent differences between 
criminal and civil law which might prevent them appearing simply as different points 
on a continuous spectrum. Nor, therefore, does it consider whether there may be 
disadvantages associated with such a ‘spectrum’ approach. Section 3 thus examines 
what criminal law is, how it differs from civil law and concludes that there is 
something special about the criminal law, namely that it signals moral condemnation 
of the criminalised conduct. Further, it is argued in this section that as it has not been 
made clear how the original, or reformed, criminal cartel offence reflects or builds 
moral stigma
10
 of prohibited conduct, there is a risk not only that it will continue to be 
ineffective but that its existence might damage the condemnatory force of the criminal 
law more generally. Section 4 goes on to examine substantive and procedural 
problems which have created practical difficulties in drafting, implementing and 
properly confining the scope of the criminal cartel offence and which seem likely to 
have contributed to its under-enforcement.  
Given the risks and concerns identified, Section 5 concludes that caution should be 
exercised before a state, intent on increasing deterrents to cartel activity, decides to 
criminalise such conduct. Consequently, it recommends that such jurisdictions should 
consider not only criminalisation of cartel activity but whether steps to enhance civil 
enforcement might be a preferable and more efficient solution for increasing the force 
of, and respect for, cartel rules.  
2. CRIMINALISATION OF CARTELS: A GROWING TREND? 
Of all agreements, cartels most contradict the principles of the free market economy: 
the operators specifically conspire to eliminate the free play of competition between 
themselves. In addition they are costly to create and enforce,
11
 harm efficiency
12
 and 
are ‘naked’ - ‘[t]hey seek to restrict competition without producing any objective 
 
9
  The term ‘criminal’ is used here in the traditional sense and distinctly to the broader use of that 
term used in the context of the European Convention of Human Rights, see especially n 24 and 
text. 
10
  The different meanings of stigma are discussed further below, section 3.B. 
11
  R. Van den Bergh and P. Camesasca , European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative 
Perspective (2nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 5.2.1.2. See OFT 386, ‘The development of 
targets for consumer savings arising from competition policy’, Chap. 5. 
12
  See eg, OECD Report ‘Fighting Hard Core Cartels, ‘Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead’ 
(2003). 
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countervailing benefits’.13 Indeed, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (‘OECD’) has estimated that cartels cost society billions and thwart the 
gains sought to be achieved through global market liberalization.
14
 In consequence, it 
has led an international effort to halt cartel conduct urging member countries to ensure 
that their competition laws effectually deter cartel conduct by, in particular, providing 
for effective sanctions.
15
 Further, competition authorities now work together, 
particularly through the International Competition Network (the ICN),
16
 but also 
though other formal and informal bilateral and multilateral arrangements, to combat 
cartels and to coordinate searches and investigations across jurisdictions.  
In the EU, a network of competition authorities, the European Competition Network 
(ECN), comprised of the European Commission (the Commission) and the national 
competition authorities of the Member States (NCAs) are responsible for public 
enforcement of the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements set out in Article 101 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). When enforcing Article 
101, the Commission acts as an integrated decision-maker, deciding which cases to 
investigate, whether to initiate proceedings, whether an infringement has occurred and 
what sanctions should be imposed on undertakings in breach, in an administrative 
procedure. Regulation 1/2003, reflecting the more traditionally outcome-oriented, 
regulatory and empirical approach to competition and cartel regulation in the EU,
17
 
specifically provides that decisions adopted by the Commission using this procedure 
‘shall not be of a criminal law nature’.18 Nonetheless, in line with the international 
trend, the Commission now considers fighting cartels to be one of its core priorities 
and over the last couple of decades has radically changed its policy and approach to 
ensure effective action against them. It uses strong language against cartels (Mario 
 
13
  M. Monti, ‘Fighting Cartels Why and How?’ 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference 
Stockholm, 11–12 Sept. 2000.  
14
  The existence of such harm, however, does not on its own lead inevitably to the conclusion that 
criminal law must be used in order to deter the activity. As will be discussed in further detail 
below, the key to the use of criminal law is its unique ability automatically to signal society’s 
moral condemnation of the activity, and this is in turn dependent on a combination of both harm 
and an assessment of the moral culpability of the defendants in producing that harm. Indeed for 
some theorists, this culpability is of greater significance than the harm produced. See, e.g. A 
Ashworth, ‘Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the 
Common Law’ (1987-1988) 19 Rutgers Law Journal 725, esp 742. 
15
  See especially OECD Publication C(98)35/FINAL, above n 1. See also eg OECD Policy Brief, 
‘Hard Core Cartels—Harm and Effective Sanctions’ (2002) and OECD Reports ‘Fighting Hard 
Core Cartels’ ibid and ‘Hard Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998 
Council Recommendation (2005). 
16
  An ICN International Anti-Cartel Enforcement Workshop has been held each annually since 1999 
and the ICN Cartels Working Group prepares reports (see eg Cartel Settlements (2008) and 
Cooperation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations (2006)) and papers (see eg 
‘Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct’, n 8). See also Shaffer and Nesbitt, n 7 
17
  C Harding and J Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe (OUP, 2nd ed, 2010), Chap II.  
18
  [2003] OJ L1/1, art 23(5), but see n 24 and text. A further issue is whether cartel activity should be 
criminalised at the EU level, see eg, W Wils, ‘Is Criminalisation of EU Competition Law the 
Answer?’ (2005) 28(2) World Competition 17. Until recently the EU’s competence in the sphere of 
criminal law was relatively limited, see eg, S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 ed 2011).  
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Monti, for example, famously described them as ‘cancers on the open market 
economy’19), its procedures have become more prosecutorial in nature, it frequently 
adopts a number of cartel infringement decisions each year and imposes massive fines 
on ‘undertakings’20 found to have participated in the breach21 which are not out of line 
with those imposed on corporations in the US following criminal proceedings. The 
Commission has also increased international cooperation focused on the elimination 
of hardcore cartel activity, adopted and honed a leniency programme
22
 and introduced 
a procedure for the settlement of cartel cases.
23
  
An integrated agency model, where a single agency undertakes investigative, 
enforcement, and adjudicative functions, is also utilised in a number of EU Member 
States (including in the UK), as a mechanism for enforcing EU and national 
competition laws. A number of concerns have been arising about this model of 
enforcement, especially at the EU level. First, there is unease about the radical 
changes in the nature of the Commission’s approach. This, combined with the 
recognition that antitrust fines (designed to have deterrent effect) are to be treated as de 
facto ‘criminal’ charges24 within the meaning of Article 6(1) European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), has led to increasingly vociferous claims 
that the EU enforcement structure is not sufficient to comply with Article 6 ECHR and, in 
particular, to ensure the investigated undertakings’ right to a fair trial.25 Case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) indicates, however, that the integrated 
agency model for competition enforcement is compatible with Article 6 so long as 
certain conditions are satisfied.
26
 In particular, the administrative body’s preliminary 
decision-taking procedures must be governed by sufficiently strong procedural guarantees 
and its decisions must be subject to sufficient judicial control by a body with ‘full 
 
19
  M. Monti, ‘Fighting Cartels Why and How?’ 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference, 
Stockholm, 11–12 Sept. 2000. See also eg, ‘ACCC Chiefs Past and Present in Stand Against Price 
Fixing’, CCH News Headlines (Sydney), 25 June 2007. 
20
  Any entity engaged in economic activity, frequently corporations, see Case C-41/90, Höfner and 
Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21. 
21
  See DGComp’s Statistics on cartels, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf. 
22
  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html. 
23
  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/settlements.html. 
24
  And in spite of their characterisation in Regulation 1/2003 as administrative charges. The term 
criminal has its own distinct meaning in ECHR case law, see eg, Engel v Netherlands (1979-80) 1 
EHRR 647, Stenuit v France[1992] ECC 401, Case C-272/09P, KME Germany AG v Commission, 
10 February 2011 (Opinion of AG Sharpston), D Slater, S Thomas, D Waelbroeck, ‘Competition 
Law Proceedings before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for 
Reform?‟ (2009) European Competition Journal 97. 
25
  See, in particular, eg, I Forrester, ‘Due Process in EC competition cases: A distinguished 
institution with flawed procedures’ (2009) EL Rev 817 and W Wils, ‘The Increased Level of EU 
Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 33(1) 
World Competition 5. 
26
  See especially A Menarini Diagnostics SRL v Italy, 43509/08, ECtHR, 21 September 2011 
A Jones and R Williams, ‘The UK Response to the Global Effort Against Cartels’ see (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement  
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jurisdiction’ on questions of fact and of law and with power to quash challenged decision 
in all respects.
27
 
Second, and conversely perhaps, the view is increasingly being articulated that these 
penalties are not sufficient to deter cartel behaviour which is easily hidden and reaps 
significant profits. Corporate
28
 fines do not target individuals responsible, may have 
spill-over effects (penalising innocent shareholders, employees and creditors) and 
would need to be impossibly high to ensure deterrence.
29
  
‘To deter cartel activity, the sanctions imposed on cartel participants must 
produce sufficient disutility to outweigh what the participants expect to gain 
from the cartel activity. Moreover, the disutility of the sanctions must 
outweigh the expected gain by enough to account for the fact that the sanctions 
may not be imposed at all and would be imposed, if at all, after the gains had 
been realised.’30  
Indeed, some studies reinforce the view that corporate fines are not the highest 
concern to companies
31
 and may not be deterring recidivism in the EU.
32
 
Consequently, it is more frequently being advocated that control which recognises the 
role that individuals play in instigating, or not preventing, competition law 
infringements is required.
33
 In the US, for example, violation of the Sherman Act is a 
felony and, for some time, both Republican and Democratic administrations have 
 
27
  See ibid and eg, W Wils, ‘The compatibility with fundamental rights of the EU antitrust 
enforcement system in which the European Commission acts both as investigator and as first-
instance decision maker’ (2014) 37(1) World Competition ***. 
28
  The EU competition law prohibitions are directed at ‘undertakings’ and do not provide sanctions 
for ‘individuals’ who are not themselves undertakings, but see S Thomas, “Guilty of a Fault that 
one has not Committed. The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out by the 
Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law” [2012] JECLAP 11 and A Jones, ‘The 
Boundaries of an Undertaking’ [2012] 3(2) European Competition Journal 301, n 138. 
29
  See eg, Wils n 18, OECD ‘Hard Core Cartels—Harm and Effective Sanctions’, n 15, 96–8, J. 
Connor, ‘Optimal Deterrence and Private International Cartels’ Purdue Working Paper, 2006, E. 
Combe and C. Monnier, ‘Fines against hard core cartels in Europe: The myth of over enforcement’ 
[2011] Ant Bull 235, B Wardaugh, ‘Closing the Deterrence Gap: Individual Liability, the Cartel 
Offence and the BIS Consultation’ [2011] Comp Law 175. 
30
  GJ Werden, ‘Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment fit the Crime’ [2009] European 
Competition Journal 19, 28. 
31
  See eg, OFT Report, Drivers of Compliance and Non-compliance with Competition Law (May 
2010). 
32
  J. Connor, ‘Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1999-2009’ (2010) 6(2) 
Competition Policy International 3, but see W Wils, ‘Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2012) 35(1) World Competition 5. In the US, it appears that no 
corporation or individual convicted for cartel activity has been engaged in another cartel 
prosecuted in the US, see GJ Werden SD Hammond BA Barnett, ‘Recidivism Eliminated: Cartel 
Enforcement in the United States since 1999’ Georgetown Global Antitrust Enforcement 
Symposium September 2011. 
33
  See n 36 and eg, OFT Report, n 31 and A Hoel, ‘Crime Does Not Pay but Hard-Core Cartel 
Conduct May: Why it Should be Criminalised’ (2008) 16 Trade Practices Law Journal 102. 
Individual sanctions do not necessarily have to be criminal in nature, see e.g. A Khan, ‘Rethinking 
Sanctions for Breaching EU Competition Law: Is Director Disqualification the Answer?’ [2012] 
35(1) World Competition 77, 82 and below section 5. 
A Jones and R Williams, ‘The UK Response to the Global Effort Against Cartels’ see (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement  
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aggressively pursued both corporations and individuals involved in cartel activity in 
criminal proceedings.
34
 Where violations are found, US Courts not only impose fines 
on corporations and individuals responsible, but sentence individuals to prison.
35
  
US enforcers, working with and through organisations such as the OECD and the 
ICN, have not been shy about advocating their view that tough sanctions against 
cartels are required, and that imprisonment of individuals provides the most effective 
deterrent to cartel behaviour.
36
 This rhetoric, combined with the perceived success of 
the US criminal programme, has led many jurisdictions to introduce, or to consider 
introducing, criminal regimes for cartel behaviour, or certain forms of it (such as bid 
rigging). More than 20 states now have criminal cartel offences, whilst others have 
specific offences against bid-rigging.
37
  
In the UK, for example, the Government concluded in 2001 that, in addition to 
provision for corporate fines and the ability to disqualify directors of companies found 
to have committed a competition law infringement,
38
 there was a strong case for 
introducing criminal provisions addressed to individuals involved in cartel activity:
39
 
custodial sentences for individuals would ‘focus the mind of potential cartelists’,40 
would be more likely to deter cartels and would be fairer than corporate fines. UK 
competition rules are therefore now founded on a combination of civil and criminal 
laws. Not only may administrative, or private civil, proceedings be brought against 
‘undertakings’ which have violated Article 101 and/or Chapter I of the Competition 
Act 1998 (CA98)
41
 (the UK equivalent of Article 101), but, since 2003, individuals 
engaged in cartel agreements
42
 may violate the criminal cartel offence introduced in 
the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02).
43
 To maintain consistency with EU law, the UK 
 
34
  DI Baker ‘Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?’ in C Beaton-Wells and 
A Ezrachi (eds) Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement 
(Hart Publishing, 2011), 27. See further section 3. 
35
  See eg, the charts set out on the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s website, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/264101.html. 
36
  See speeches by SD Hammond, ‘The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last 
Two Decades’ Feb 25 2010, 11, SD Hammond ‘Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency 
Programme’ November 2004, 8 and BA Barnett, ‘Criminalization of Cartel Conduct-The 
Changing Landscape’ 3 April 2009  
37
  See A Stephan, ‘Lessons from the UK’s Experience of Criminalising Cartels’ (24 September 2012) 
presentation at The Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, Pembroke College, Oxford and Shaffer and 
Nesbitt, n 7 (‘More than thirty countries have criminalized cartel conduct in some form. All but 
five have done so since 1995 and over twenty since 2000, and the list is growing.’) 
38
  EA, s. 204, amending the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986. 
39
  Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) White Paper A World Class Competition Regime, (CM 
5233). See also Joint Treasury/DTI Report ‘The UK’s Competition Regime’. 
40
  Joint Treasury/DTI Report ‘The UK’s Competition Regime’ 2001 and OFT365, ‘Proposed 
criminalisation of cartels in the UK’ A report prepared for the OFT by Sir Anthony Hammond 
KCB QC and Roy Penrose OBE QPM (November 2001), 1.4. 
41
  The CA98 brought into effect prohibitions of anti-competitive agreements and practices modelled 
on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (the Chapter I and II prohibitions respectively).  
42  
 EA02, Part 6 (which came into effect on 20 June 2003). 
43
  The offence is extraditable. 
A Jones and R Williams, ‘The UK Response to the Global Effort Against Cartels’ see (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement  
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criminal cartel offence was created entirely separately from the administrative one
44
 
and made applicable only to individuals not to ‘undertakings’. Further, a dishonesty45 
requirement was incorporated into the original offence which was intended, in 
particular: to ensure that the regime would not be applicable to individuals engaged in 
activities which would be lawful under the civil regime (for example, because they 
produce countervailing benefits and so are compatible with Article 101/CA98 on 
account of their pro-competitive effects);
46
 to signal the seriousness of the offence; to 
make it more likely that courts would impose custodial sentences; and to reduce the 
risk that the offence would be categorised as ‘national competition law’ for the 
purposes of Regulation 1/2003.
47
 ‘Whilst it was recognised at the time that the 
inclusion of a dishonesty requirement was an imperfect means of achieving these 
objectives, it was seen as the best available option’.48 
It is well known that, in spite of this marked increase in preference for criminalisation 
across the world, successful deployment of criminal enforcement models has not 
proved easy outside of the US. In some jurisdictions (such as Ireland), for example, 
authorities have successfully prosecuted individuals, but have been unable to persuade 
courts to imprison offenders.
49
 In the UK, the deterrent effect of the cartel offence has 
been weaker than intended ‘because there have been so few completed cases to 
date’.50 Rather than the six-ten prosecutions per year predicted,51 only three 
individuals, in relation to a single cartel - the Marine Hoses cartel,
52
 were convicted 
and sentenced to prison during its first ten years. The only other criminal prosecution 
brought, of British Airways employees, spectacularly collapsed when it emerged that 
certain evidence had not been properly disclosed by the OFT, causing significant 
 
44
  As recommended by OFT365, n 40 and below section 3. 
45
  Under R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, see further nn 103-104 and text. 
46
  But without allowing the criminal trial to be muddied by complicated economic evidence 
arguments based on the legal exception criteria of Article 101(3)/CA98, see below section 4.A.  
47
  See IB v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2575. The Government’s concern has been that if the 
cartel offence were to constitute national competition law it would become impossible to bring 
criminal proceedings where parallel proceedings were brought at the EU level. The UK authorities 
would then have to comply with the principle of supremacy and framework for cooperation 
between the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) set out in Regulation 1/2003 
and enforcement would essentially be relegated to purely domestic cartels. This is perceived to be 
a difficulty in Ireland, see P Massey and JD Cooke, ‘Competition Offences in Ireland: The Regime 
and Its Results’, in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, n 34. 
48
  A Nikpay, ‘Cartel Enforcement: Past, Present and Future’ Speech 11 December 2012 and ibid, 
paras 1.9-1.12 and Chap 2. 
49
  See eg, T Calvani and KM Carl, ‘The Competition Act 2002, ten years later: lessons from the Irish 
experience of prosecuting cartels as criminal offences (2013) 1(2) J Antitrust Enforcement 296. 
50
  Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), A competition regime for growth: a 
consultation on options for reform (March 2011) (the Consultation Document).  
51
  OFT365, n 40, 3.6. 
52
  See OFT Press Release, ‘Three Imprisoned in first OFT Criminal Prosecution for Bid-rigging’ 
(June 11, 2008); R v Whittle, Brammar & Allison [2008] EWCA Crim 2560. But see A Nikpay, 
‘Cartel Enforcement: Past, Present and Future’ Speech 11 December 2012.  
A Jones and R Williams, ‘The UK Response to the Global Effort Against Cartels’ see (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement  
 
10 
 
embarrassment to the OFT.
53
 In its 2010 consultation on reform of the UK 
competition law regime, the Government concluded that the most important 
contributing factor responsible for the dearth of criminal cases and the weakening of 
the offence’s deterrent effect had been the incorporation of the dishonesty requirement 
into the offence.
54
 Following consultation,
55
 it went on to remove the dishonesty 
requirement from the offence and to add statutory exclusions and defences instead.
56
 
These changes, introduced by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
(ERRA13), will come into force in April 2014 along with other significant changes to 
the UK competition law regime, including the creation of a single Competition 
Markets Authority (the CMA).  
This article takes the view that although incorporation of a dishonesty requirement is 
likely to have been a factor in the criminal regime’s lack of success, it is by no means 
clear that it was the decisive factor. Rather, it considers that the most fundamental 
problem has been that the Government has not engaged sufficiently with the question 
of why criminalisation is necessary and appropriate at all for individual cartel 
behaviour. Further, that the Government has underestimated the substantive and 
practical problems arising from criminalisation
57
 and, in particular, from the operation 
of parallel civil and criminal cartel regimes. As these wider matters have not been 
addressed by the 2013 reforms, there is a concern that they may persist. 
3. THE UK PERSPECTIVE: IS CRIMINALISATION LEGITIMATE? 
A. THE EXPANDING USE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE REGULATORY CONTEXT 
The drive for criminalisation in the UK resulted not from a public sense of ‘moral 
outrage’ and a bottom-up (or backward-looking) process, but from a top-down 
(forward-looking) one, driven by the international initiatives described above and the 
Government and OFT who were eager to introduce greater deterrents to cartel 
activity. This approach reflects the UK Government’s willingness more generally to 
utilise a variety of alternative offences and enforcement tools – civil/ administrative 
and criminal - as mechanisms for promoting and encouraging compliance with a 
regulatory objective.
58
 This means that civil and criminal offences in the UK 
 
53
  See OFT withdraws criminal proceedings against current and former BA executives, press release 
47/10 (10 May 2010), R v George, Burn, Burnett and Crawley [2010] EWCA Crim 1148 and J 
Joshua, ‘The BA cartel trial: The OFT got the wrong type of high-impact outcome in this case’ 
[2010] 29 June Competition Law Insight 13. 
54
  Notwithstanding the lack of live evidence of difficulties arising during the course of a jury trial in a 
contested case, the government has concluded that is more likely than not that the inclusion of the 
‘dishonesty’ element in the cartel offence is in fact inhibiting the OFT in prosecuting cases. 
‘Dishonesty’ seems to be particularly difficult to prosecute in a white collar criminal environment. 
BIS ‘Growth, competition and the competition regime: Government response to consultation’(May 
2012), 7.8. 
55
  Consultation Document, n 50.  
56
  See EA ss 188A-B, as amended by the ERRA13, s 47. 
57
  The failure of the British Airways prosecution, for example, appeared to have resulted most 
immediately from procedural failings. 
58
  See generally Law Commission Consultation Report 195, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory 
Contexts: A Consultation Paper’ (2010). 
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frequently overlap and administrative proceedings occur where criminal proceedings 
are also potentially possible. Indeed as the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 
2008 permits a wide range of sanctions to be used by regulators in administrative 
proceedings (for example, fines, public censure, and/or compensatory or restorative 
sanctions) which may be as severe as, and in some instances indistinguishable from, 
those that might result following criminal proceedings in the criminal courts, 
regulators have many options.
59
  
This approach, as well as contributing to a significant blurring of the line between 
civil and criminal law, has arguably resulted both in the overuse of criminal law, 
outside of its traditional context, and its under-enforcement.
60
  
B. WHAT IS CRIMINAL LAW?  
In determining whether it might be justifiable to use criminal law as a mechanism 
simply for deterring cartel activity, an important initial question is whether there is 
something distinctive about criminal law which requires it to be kept separate from 
civil law, and if so what that is. It is relatively straightforward to point to a series of 
descriptive criteria which are traditionally associated with criminal, as opposed to 
civil, regimes. Nonetheless, it is difficult to use these to define what is understood as 
‘criminal law’. Although therefore criminal law frequently: deals with public or third 
party as opposed to private harm;
61
 reflects a difference between private and state 
prosecution of wrongdoing;
62
 incorporates a mens rea requirement;
63
 involves social 
stigma or disapproval
64
 or stronger investigative powers
65
 and correspondingly 
 
59
  J Black in Law Commission Consultation Report 195, n 58, Appendix A 
60
  See further section 4. Under-enforcement arises in this situation because of the tendency for 
enforcement agencies to rely principally on easier-to-prove administrative regimes and 
administrative sanctions, with criminal law being used only as a last and final resort, see R 
Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (Better Regulation Executive)(Final 
Report, November 2006), The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 (RESA),  J Black 
ibid, Appendix A, M Furse, The Criminal Law of Competition in the UK and in the US: Failure 
and Success (Edward Elgar, 2012), 215-224 and R White, ‘Civil Penalties: Oxymoron, Chimera 
and Stealth Sanction’ [2010] LQR 593. 
61
  See, e.g. SE Marshall & RA Duff, ‘Criminalisation and Sharing Wrongs’ (1998)11 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7, R Bowles, M Faure and N Garoupa, ‘The Scope of Criminal 
Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications’ (2008) 35 Journal of 
Law and Society 389, 391-2; R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974), 65–
71; L Becker, ‘Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes’ (1974) 3 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 262 and G Lamond, ‘What is a crime?’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
609. 
62
  See P Robinson, ‘The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert’, (1996) 76 Boston 
University Law Review 201, 204, Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, ibid, 391 and G Williams, ‘The 
Definition of Crime’, (1955) Current Legal Problems Ch 7,  123. 
63
  Bowles, Garoupa and Faure, n 61. See also Wils, n 39 and J Coffee, ‘Paradigms Lost: the Blurring 
of the Criminal and Civil Law Models – And What Can Be Done About It’ (1992) 101 Yale Law 
Journal 1875, 1878. 
64
  Bowles, Garoupa and Faure n 61, and Coffee, ibid. 
65
  See, e.g. Coffee, n 63. 
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stronger rights of defence;
66
 is concerned
67
 with punishment,
68
 retribution,
69
 or 
communication of values and not compensation (the concern of civil law);
70
 the 
difficulty with all of these ‘distinctions’ is that counter-examples can generally be 
given. Thus as far as the public nature of criminal harm is concerned
71
 private 
prosecutions, although rare, can be brought in English criminal law, while conversely, 
public intervention can equally be civil rather than criminal. Further, criminal law 
does not always require mens rea, since it contains offences of strict liability
72
 and 
there is not a perfect match between criminal law and the generation of stigma, or a 
perfect division between compensation as opposed to punishment, retribution or 
communication of values.
73
 Indeed, it has already been seen that is now common 
within the administrative sphere to provide for ‘penal’ sanctions, enforced by a public 
agency in an administrative procedure, and that, so long as certain conditions are 
satisfied, this appears to be compatible with the ECHR. A second problem is that even 
if, for example, there are valid distinctions which can be drawn, such as the different 
burden of proof in criminal, as opposed to civil law, or the exclusive ability of the 
criminal law to imprison,
74
 these are purely descriptive and do not explain why 
criminal and civil law are regarded as different systems or indeed whether they should 
be.
75
 Answers to this more normative question vary.  
Lamond, for example, argues that crimes are the sorts of serious wrongs that warrant 
state punishment of the wrongdoer.
76
 Only grave ‘wrongs that manifest an 
unwillingness to be guided by the value violated’ thus merit punishment under the 
criminal law. Indeed, Lamond argues that as ‘part of the value of criminal law lies in 
its constituting the most serious form of censure and condemnation open to a 
 
66
  ibid. 
67
  J Coffee, ‘Does “Unlawful” mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime 
Distinction in American Law’, (1991) 71 Boston University Law Review 193. 
68
  Thus, for example, Tadros argues that it is punishment that ought to guide us in determining what 
to criminalize, V Tadros, ‘Criminalisation and Regulation’, University of Warwick School of Law 
legal Studies Research Paper No 2009-08. 
69
  See, e.g. H Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, (OUP 1968) and D Galligan, ‘The Return 
to Retribution in Penal Theory’ in C Tapper (ed) Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in memory 
of Sir Rupert Cross, ( Butterworths, 1981). 
70
  See Coffee, n 67, 208 and Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 61. See also D Seipp, ‘The Distinction 
between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law’ (1996) 76 Boston University Law Review 59. 
71
  See Coffee, ibid and references n 61. For a response to Duff and Marshall specifically, see 
Lamond, n 61 In relation to the mens rea requirement there are of course crimes of strict liability. 
72
  On which see further, e.g. Lamond, n 61 and A Duff, Answering for Crime (Hart 2007), chapters 4 
and 6.  
73
  D Friedman, ‘Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction’ (1996) 76 Buffalo University Law Review103, 
110.  
74
  Although even this has not always been the case, see further Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 61, fn 
35.  
75
  See Robinson, n 62. 
76
  Lamond, n 61, 631. 
A Jones and R Williams, ‘The UK Response to the Global Effort Against Cartels’ see (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement  
 
13 
 
community – in singling out certain conduct for this treatment’, the relationship 
between the legal and lay concepts of crime is ‘symbiotic’.77  
The criminal cartel offence, however, presents an example of the criminal law being 
expanded beyond a body of law which derives from, and presupposes, some moral 
delinquency.
78
 The public in the UK have not habitually been disapproving of cartels. 
Rather, they have ‘traditionally been tolerant of, if not positively welcoming’79 of 
them. Even following the introduction of the cartel offence, it does not appear that 
public attitudes towards cartels have changed: survey evidence indicates that attitudes 
have remained weak and that there is not great public support for the offence or a 
consensus that price fixing is morally wrong.
80
  
On the other hand, the contrary view is that there is no such essential distinction 
between civil and criminal law and that it is legitimate to use criminal law in the way 
the Government has done as simply another form of preference shaping disincentives. 
This approach
81
 asks ‘what makes particular combinations of choices more or less 
appropriate for dealing with particular kinds of offences in a particular society’?82 
From this perspective, civil law and criminal law ‘are simply two regions on the law’s 
continuum of deterrent threats’83 and the decision about whether an activity should 
constitute a criminal offence will ‘be based on a comparison between alternative 
methods of controlling the activity and is not, in general, intrinsic to the activity’.84 
 
77
  ibid, 612. He thus takes the view that while designating conduct as criminal is meant to convey the 
seriousness of the wrongdoing, it is crimes of mens rea which best fit this conception of criminality 
78
  Ashworth and Zedner note that over 3000 new offences were created under the Labour 
Government first elected in 1997, many of which do not conform to the historical paradigm of 
criminal law, A Ashworth and L Zedner, ‘Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the 
Changing Character of Crime, Procedure and Sanctions’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
21, 22. 
79
  J Joshua, ‘Can the UK Cartel Offence be Resuscitated’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, n 34, 145 
relying on M O’Kane, The Law of Criminal Cartels: Practice and Procedure (OUP 2009), 17-22 
80
  See eg, A Stephan ‘Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain’ 
(2008) 5 Competition Law Review 123, A Stephan, ‘The Battle for Hearts and Minds: The Role of 
the Media in Treating Cartels as Criminal’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, n 34, 381, J Joshua, 
‘Shooting the Messenger: Does the UK Criminal Cartel Offense Have a Future’ (2010) 
theantitrustsource August, 5 and Norris n 119. 
81
  Traditionally described as an economic, or ‘law and economics’ approach, See, e.g. Bowles, Faure 
and Garoupa, above n 61,, Robinson, n 62, 205. It begins with Cooter’s distinction between 
‘prices’ on the one hand and ‘sanctions’ on the other, R Cooter, ‘Prices and Sanctions’, (1984) 84 
Columbia Law Review 15. However, as will become apparent in what follows, it should not be 
assumed that the results of such an approach will be at odds with those achieved through 
alternative philosophical approaches.  
82
  D Friedman, n 73, 110. 
83
  Robinson, n 62, 205, citing S Shavell, ‘Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary 
Sanctions as a Deterrent’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 1232, 1235 and R Posner, ‘An 
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law’ (1985) Columbia Law Review 1193. See also Coffee, n67, 
222 arguing that from this ‘perspective, both tort and criminal law are simply means of controlling 
externalities’. 
84
  Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 61, 415. 
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Instead, the first question is whether an activity should be ‘priced’ or ‘sanctioned’.85 If 
sanctions are necessary then the question is how they can be made effective, which is 
in turn dependent on a number of factors.
86
 Following this approach there is a role for 
criminal law
87
 when (i) the balance comes down against the use of civil sanctions 
(perhaps imposed by administrative agencies)
88
; or (ii) where it is necessary to impose 
serious non-monetary sanctions unique to the criminal law, such as imprisonment, 
which, has low social utility.
89
 From this perspective, therefore, except where these 
serious non-monetary sanctions are involved (see further below), there is no inherent 
relationship between the sanction and the criminal/civil distinction – rather the 
relationship is between the sanction and the potential error costs it involves and the 
procedural protections which are necessary to counteract them: it does not demand the 
choice of one particular system of law (civil/criminal) over the other.  
The problem with this latter view is that it does not explain why it is then that ‘every 
society sufficiently developed to have a formal legal system uses the criminal-civil 
distinction as an organizing principle’.90 Thus while it might be possible to start from 
scratch and allocate the roles of private law, administrative sanctions and criminal 
sanctions according to this account, it does not explain why criminal law is, in so 
many places,
91
 a wholly separate system. Why, as Robinson puts it, have societies not 
simply adopted a single system in which adequate deterrent sanctions exist? Any need 
for greater safeguards in the case of greater penalties could have simply been given 
within one unitary system, rather than ‘wasting’ ‘the criminal law’s special procedural 
safeguards  on the large number of less serious criminal cases in which the sanction is 
no greater than would be available under civil law. The answer, Robinson suggests, is 
that criminal liability ‘signals moral condemnation of the offender’92 and ‘a distinct 
 
85
  See further Cooter, above n 81. Prices are extracted for doing what is permitted, whereas sanctions 
are detriments imposed for doing what is forbidden. Whether prices or sanctions are chosen is 
dependent on whether lawmakers can most easily determine the external cost of the relevant 
activity or the socially optimal level of it. 
86
  For example, a low probability of detection will necessitate an increase in the ultimate sanction in 
order to retain the necessary degree of deterrence (Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 61). The use of 
punitive damages as a sanction is an option, but may create perverse incentives for the bringing of 
claims (Coffee, n 67, 231); the use of administrative as opposed to criminal sanctions may mean 
that the enforcing agency has particular expertise, but conversely can involve coordination costs 
such as agency capture (Bowles, Faure and Garoupa at 407, citing P Fenn and C Veljanovski, ‘A 
Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement’ (1988) 98 Economic Journal 1055. 
87
  And of course the greater procedural protection it provides, given that the stakes and thus error 
costs are higher. 
88
  As a result of the considerations noted in n 86. 
89
  As compared with, for example, compensation which is received by the victim. Bowles, Faure and 
Garoupa, n 61 at, 405-6. See also V Khanna, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It 
Serve?’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1477.  
90
  Robinson, n 62, 202. 
91
  Listed by Robinson, ibid, 201. 
92
  ibid, 203-206. The notion of moral condemnation here is of a particular, narrow and serious form; 
there will often be activities which attract moral stigma which would not be considered worthy of 
the specific and serious signal of condemnation provided by criminal law. For example, in western 
legal systems adultery is not a criminal offence and there is no suggestion that it should become so. 
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criminal justice system is the only way to effectively express condemnation and to 
gain the practical benefits of doing so… by creating a special criminal label and 
widely disseminating the notion that this label has a different, condemnatory meaning, 
the system enhances its ability to communicate a clear condemnatory message. 
Without a distinct criminal system, it would be more difficult to convey the message 
that some cases signal condemnation yet others do not.’93 Thus, he concludes, even 
‘utilitarians ought to want to maintain and sharpen the criminal-civil distinction 
because it enhances the system’s power to reduce crime efficiently’.94 
This account also explains why imprisonment is exclusively used in the criminal 
sphere. On the one hand, imprisonment could, in theory, be justified purely on the 
basis of prophylaxis or deterrence, in which case there would be no reason why it 
could not be used outside the criminal sphere.
95
 However, this is not how 
imprisonment currently does operate. First, it is not available outside criminal law, 
and this does not appear to be merely a matter of chance. Second, the factors taken 
into account in deciding whether or not to impose a criminal sentence and if so how 
long it should be, do not simply reflect ideas of incapacitation from further offending 
or deterrence.
96
 It appears, therefore, that imprisonment is inherently, as well as 
practically, unique to criminal law, and that the ability to impose a sentence of 
imprisonment is part of the criminal law’s moral signalling function. The imposition 
of a sentence of imprisonment does therefore necessitate the use of a distinct criminal 
law process. 
This conclusion on the distinctiveness of criminal law fits well both with Lamond’s 
desire to retain the ‘doctrinal purity’ of criminal law and with the view of those who 
regard criminal law simply as part of ‘a preference-shaping system of disincentives’97 
but who rely on the role of ‘stigma’ as a potential advantage of the criminal system.98 
 
For further discussion of the concept of stigma and in particular the distinction between 
psychological (felt) and normative (justifiable) stigma, see J Stanton-Ife, ‘Strict Liability: Stigma 
and Regret’ (2007) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 151, especially 156 onwards.  
93
   ibid, 208.  
94
  ibid, 212. 
95
  As noted above, from the point of view of deterrence there is no inherent connection between any 
given sanction and a particular system of law (civil/criminal), provided that whichever system of 
law is used, adequate procedural protections are available to counterbalance the greater error cost 
and lack of social utility of the sanction in question 
96
  Thus, for example, Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 142(1) lists 5 purposes of sentencing to which a 
sentencing court must have regard, which includes punishment as well as deterrence, 
rehabilitation, public protection and reparation. The Sentencing Guidelines Council’s Guideline on 
Seriousness elaborates on these principles by saying that a sentence must start by considering the 
seriousness of the offence, which will be the key factor in deciding the length of a custodial 
sentence. ‘The seriousness of an offence is determined by two main parameters’: the culpability of 
the offender and the harm caused or risked by the offence. Culpability is then determined by 
reference to the offender’s mens rea, i.e. intent, recklessness, knowledge or negligence. 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_seriousness_guideline.pdf 
97
  Robinson, n 62. See also D Friedman, n 82 and Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 84. 
98
  See, e.g. Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 61, 406-7, although they note that stigma may encourage 
rather than deterring career criminals. See also Khanna, n 89, 1492 and 1497 onwards and R 
Epstein, ‘The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later’ (1996) 76 Boston University law 
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It also suggests that, when considering whether conduct should be criminalised, there 
should not be too great deviation from what is regarded, or should be regarded, as 
being reprehensible and deserving of such stigma; there is a need to be wary of 
forward-looking reasoning which undermines the backward-looking force of criminal 
law. This does not mean that the criminal law cannot be used to shape or change 
society’s view of the acceptability of a particular activity. What it does mean, 
however, is that the criminal law should not be utilised simply as a mechanism for 
creating deterrence without addressing the issue of moral stigma.
99
 If criminal law is 
to have an educative role, it must make clear what is morally reprehensible about the 
activity in question.
100
 
In determining whether to criminalise conduct, it is also important to pay attention 
both to what has been made criminal but also to what has not (Katz’s problem of non-
felonious villainy).
101
 The credibility of the criminal law may be undermined if one 
activity is criminalised while another, apparently equally delinquent activity, is not, 
unless there is a coherent technique for distinguishing between the two.   
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK CRIMINAL CARTEL OFFENCE  
i. A forward-looking approach to criminal law 
It has been seen that at the time the original criminal offence was adopted cartels were 
not perceived to be morally wrong. Rather, criminalisation was driven by a top-down, 
forward-looking process.
102
 It has also been seen that complications can arise where a 
backward-looking approach to the criminal law is not adopted. In the context of the 
criminal cartel offences these difficulties were compounded by the decision to 
incorporate a dishonesty requirement within the original offence. The challenges 
 
Review 1, 19. Indeed even Williams’, n 62, technical approach warns that ‘[w]hen the concept of 
crime is weakened by being made to take in the vast number of summary offences under statute, 
the tendency must be for the word with its associations to lose its former emotive effect’ Thus 
confining the definition of crime ‘to the more serious offences would have the beneficial result that 
the legal meaning would correspond more closely with the popular one’114-115. Indeed, although 
they start from different premises, there is a large degree of convergence between the two 
approaches. Lamond, although he starts from a more deontological perspective, nevertheless 
acknowledges that various practical considerations must also play a role in the decision to 
criminalise certain conduct, n 61, 628. Conversely, community standards are important in 
ascertaining how much of an activity is optimal from a consequentialist perspective (Coffee,n 67, 
227.  
99
  In either of Stanton-Ife’s senses of the word, n 92. 
100
  Normative stigma, in order to generate the necessary psychological moral stigma Stanton-Ife, n 92. 
See also Robinson n 62, Epstein, n 98, especially 20-1 and nn 107-108 and text.   
101
  L Katz, ‘Villainy and Felony: A Problem Concerning Criminalisation’ (2002) 6 Buffalo Criminal 
Law Review 480. See also Williams, n 62 where it was pointed out that in fact many of the 
examples Katz gives of supposedly non-felonious villainy are actually now criminal in England 
and Wales. 
102
  The difference between the two could in some ways be characterised by the distinction between 
focusing exclusively on the harm produced and focusing on both the harm and an assessment of 
the moral culpability of the defendant. 
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presented by the Ghosh test,
103
 which requires a jury to make both a moral assessment 
of whether the defendant’s behaviour is dishonest by the standard of reasonable and 
honest people and an assessment of whether the defendant realised that he was acting 
dishonestly by this standard, are great enough in the context of ordinary criminal laws 
such as theft.
104
 It is questionable, however, whether juries would be willing to 
conclude that a defendant had acted dishonestly in concluding a cartel agreement, in 
circumstances where the jurors would be unlikely to have pre-existing instincts about 
the kind of conduct involved and also might be swayed by arguments that, for 
example, the defendant had not benefited personally and/ or had justifications for how 
he had behaved (for example, trying to avoid redundancies or business closure).
105
 It 
seems difficult therefore to use dishonesty as a mechanism for signalling the 
seriousness of an offence and bolstering the view that it should be morally condemned 
when dishonesty relies upon, and presupposes, a pre-existing sense of moral stigma in 
order to function: ‘it does not seem possible to begin with a forward-looking offence 
in order to enhance enforcement and, without more, expect it to be successful in 
sending backward-looking signals of moral censure. The law cannot pull itself up by 
its own bootstraps in this way, any attempt to do so risks damaging both the process 
of cartel criminalisation and the criminal law more generally.’106  
In its consultation on reform the Government recognised that the dishonesty 
requirement was likely to be hindering successful prosecution of cartels. In the actual 
reforms, however, it did not address the questions which seem naturally to follow 
from such an acceptance:  if cartel behaviour is not considered to be dishonest why 
then should the conduct be criminalised at all? To be successful it seems that, as in 
other areas of white collar crime where, arguably, ‘the public learns what is criminal 
from what is punished, not vice versa’,107  the new and reformed criminal law must 
play a role in shaping and changing/educating views of the conduct, explaining why it 
is that even if the behaviour is not dishonest it should nonetheless be morally 
condemned and so permitting moral stigma to be generated. Even if therefore the 
removal of the dishonesty requirement from the UK offence makes convictions more 
straightforward, this action alone will not guarantee that censure will follow 
convictions or indeed that judges will be willing to imprison those convicted.
108
 
Rather, in addition, steps must be taken ‘to create, in part through the process of 
criminalisation itself, a strong sense of the unacceptability of the conduct in question, 
within the industry in question and beyond’:109 the process must help build an 
 
103
  See n 45. 
104
  See, e.g. A. Halpin, “The Test of Dishonesty” [1996] Criminal Law Review 283. 
105
  See eg, The Australian National University Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy, Working 
Paper ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Project: the Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity in 
Cartel Cases, May 2004. 
106
  R Williams, ‘Cartels in the Criminal Landscape’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, n 34, 298-9 and P 
Whelan, ‘The Case for Adoption of BIS’s ‘Option 4’’ (2012) European Competition Journal 589, 
592. 
107
  Coffee, ‘Paradigms Lost’, n 63, 1889; Coffee ‘Does ‘Unlawful’ Mean ‘Criminal’?’, n 70, 223-24. 
108
  This has been a difficulty in a number of jurisdictions, including Ireland, Canada and Japan, see 
e.g. Calvani and Carl, n 49. 
109
  Law Commission Consultation Report 195, n 58, 4,9 
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understanding of why cartel conduct warrants official censure, moral condemnation 
and involves a harm-related moral failing
110
 so that that it goes beyond achieving 
deterrence and punishment.  If these steps are not taken, the law will not be able to 
benefit from the deterrent effect of precisely this moral signalling function which it 
sought to harness through the criminalisation process. Further, ‘conviction may 
generate little stigma, little by way of deterrence may be achieved, and little by way of 
punishment may be justified. Consequently, the criminal law is liable to fall into 
disrepute, in the eyes of both prosecutorial agencies, and those subject to regulation, 
alike’. 111 The success of a criminal regime is also dependent upon the message about 
the ‘wrong’ of cartel behaviour not being undermined by not criminalising equally 
anticompetitive behaviour - the problem of non-felonious villainy outlined above. 
These are important points which, arguably, explain the success of the US criminal 
regime.
112
 In the US, the criminal nature of antitrust law – for corporations and 
individuals alike - has been a trait since its inception. Not only has the Sherman Act of 
1890 always provided that violations of its core antirust provisions are criminal in 
nature (originally misdemeanours, now felonies) and set out the maximum fines and 
periods of imprisonment that may follow for those found to be in breach, but the 
antitrust system as a whole has always benefitted from public support. Indeed, the 
passage of the Sherman Act 1890 was specifically a reaction to ‘populist outrage’ 
about the conduct of the ‘trusts’ and a recognition that there was a pressing need to do 
something about them.
113
 Populist support (rather than agency pressure) also drove 
Congress’s decision to transform Sherman Act violations from misdemeanours into 
serious felonies.
114
 This background has facilitated eventual
115
 acceptance that 
individuals responsible for violations should be held accountable for those breaches. 
‘Thus what seems to distinguish the US is public willingness–almost without debate–
to treat individuals who participate in cartels as serious criminals who should be 
treated in the same way as embezzlers, stock swindlers and other economic 
thieves.’116 
 
110
  ibid. See also eg A Stephan, ‘The Battle for Hearts and Minds: The Role of the Media in Treating 
Cartels as Criminal’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi, n 34, 381 
111
  ibid, 4.6-7. 
112
  See also eg, Shaffer and Nesbitt, n 7 (‘In Australia, survey evidence suggests a majority of that 
country’s public now views antitrust offenses in moral terms, following an extensive public 
relations campaign by the Australian competition authority. The survey indicates that 42% of the 
public believe that cartel conduct should be a crime, and since 2009 it now is.’) 
113
  See WL Letwin, ‘Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1980’ (1956) 23 University of 
Chicago Law Review 221, 235. and Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States 221 US 1, 50 
(1911). 
114
  Baker, n 34 and Werden, n 30.  
115
  Even then it has taken a long time for criminalisation of antitrust conduct to become accepted, see 
eg, Werden, n 30. 
116
  Baker, n 34, 27. Shaffer & Nesbitt, n 7 (‘Criminalization implicates moral judgments that vary 
with sociocultural context. U.S. antitrust law has long exhibited a moral dimension, which 
facilitates the use of criminal sanctions against individuals in cartel cases. In contrast, “there 
appears to be (at least outside North America) no strong feeling on the part of the wider public 
about the inherent criminality of price fixing and like practices.” National competition authorities 
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ii. Generating moral stigma and distinguishing other anticompetitive conduct 
In order to generate moral stigma, therefore, it would seem to be crucial for it to be 
identified with sufficient clarity what is morally reprehensible about cartel conduct; 
and what features of such activity distinguish it from other anticompetitive conduct 
which is not criminalised.  
The new criminal cartel offence contains no mens rea requirement but applies to 
horizontal price fixing and other cartel activity,
117
 unless one of the statutory 
exclusions (EA02, section 188A) or defences (EA02, section 188B) apply. The former 
specifies certain circumstances in which the cartel offence is not committed – broadly 
where (i) ‘relevant information’, sufficient to establish that the offence might apply, is 
notified to customers or a person requesting a bid, or is published, or (ii) if the 
agreement is made to comply with a legal requirement. The latter incorporates 
defences to the commission of the cartel offence - broadly where the individual can 
show that he or she (i) did not intend that the nature of the arrangements would be 
concealed from customers or the CMA or (ii) took reasonable steps to disclose his or 
her actions to a legal advisor. 
It could be argued that because, for example, the new regime ‘carves out’ agreements 
which had been notified or published and/or which have not been concealed or hidden 
from legal advisors, that a connection can be made between the covert and secretive 
agreements prohibited by the offence and the concept of ‘deception’, fraud or other 
offences against which there is a moral norm.
118
  If it was the Government’s aim in 
the new legislation to so link the new offence, the connection is at best indirect; the 
core of the new version of the offence targets price fixing and other cartel 
arrangements
119
 not deception. Deception, or at least a failure to disclose, or false 
representation is only implied. Further, deception per se is not a criminal offence. 
Thus section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 creates an offence (under section 1) where a 
person makes a false representation, but only if (s)he does so dishonestly and 
intending to make a gain or cause a loss or risk of loss.
120
 In addition, and more 
fundamentally, however, it is submitted that this approaches the issue from the wrong 
 
outside of North America recognize this uphill battle and thus view public education about the 
evils of cartel offenses as a central component of their missions...’). 
117
  EA02, s 188 (essentially, agreements between individuals to make reciprocal arrangements that 
relate to at least two undertakings and whose purpose is to fix prices, restrict output, allocate 
markets or rig bids). 
118
  See eg, P Whelan, ‘Cartel Criminalization and the Challenge of Moral Wrongfulness’ (2013) 33(3) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 535 and  B Wardhaugh, ‘A Normative Approach to the 
Criminalisation of Cartel Activity’ (2012) 32(3) Legal Studies 369.  
119
  In Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16 the House of Lords 
(now Supreme Court) confirmed that price fixing did not amount to a ‘conspiracy to defraud’ at 
common law unless some aggravating factor was present: eg, fraud, misrepresentation, violence or 
intimidation.  
120
  Further, the Fraud Act itself is hardly uncontroversial and it is not universally accepted that it 
maintains rather than undermines the criminal law’s moral signalling function, see further D 
Ormerod, ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying?’ [2007] Crim LR 193  It is not clear that 
offering goods for sale at a cartelised price would be sufficient for liability even under the wide 
ranging 2006 Fraud Act. 
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direction. Criminal law is a last resort and should be used as such. The question 
therefore should not be whether it is ex post facto possible to justify a criminal 
offence by finding some, albeit indirect, connection to the core of criminal law. 
Rather it should be whether it has been sufficiently established that only criminal law 
can truly address and signal the moral delinquency inherent in cartel conduct - in this 
case this clearly has not been done. 
The Government has also not made it clear why cartels have been singled out and 
treated differently from other types of anti-competitive agreements and single firm 
conduct. Although it could be again argued that the Government has sought, through 
the new exclusions and defences to link the offence with the fact that cartels 
frequently involve an element of secretive conspiracy (they are covert or involve a 
‘spiral of delinquency’121), are easy to conceal, are designed to clearly subvert the 
process of competition with the objective of increasing the members’ profits whilst 
causing significant economic harm to markets and customers which is ‘manifest, 
considerable, and calculable’,122 it is not clear that these factors alone are sufficient 
justification for criminalising cartel activity but not other seriously anti-competitive 
conduct. Other conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws may also cause significant 
economic harm, even if it may not be so great or as easy to quantify and/or the 
conduct may be harder to conceal.
123
 Such conduct may also involve an element of 
secretive concertation (because the conspirators wish to hide the existence of any 
serious competition law violation),
124
 a calculated defiance of the antitrust laws and/or 
an element of abuse of individual or collective corporate power - this is the reason 
why significant corporate fines have been imposed on infringing undertaking(s) for a 
number of different type of antitrust violations. Indeed the largest fine ever imposed 
by the Commission on a single undertaking was the €1.06 billion fine levied on 
Intel
125
 – not for participating in a cartel, but for abuse of its dominant position.  
The strongest argument for criminalising cartels, but not other conduct targeted by the 
antitrust laws, seems to rest on the fact that, not only do cartels restrict competition 
between competitors and cause significant harm, but that they are ‘naked’: they do not 
involve cooperation which is reasonably necessary to generate efficiencies or 
otherwise benefit consumers.
126
 The conduct does not, therefore, necessarily seem to 
require an element of secrecy or deception but is targeted because it constitutes a 
frontal assault on the principle of competition, is relatively easy to identify and to 
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  Harding and Joshua, n 17, 149. 
122
  ibid. 
123
  Further, although it is arguable that in these cases corporate fines may operate as a more effective 
deterrent, this does not seem to provide a sufficient justification for distinguishing the types of 
conduct from a moral point of view. 
124
  See also eg, Norris n 119 where the House of Lords held that secrecy cannot in itself render price-
fixing criminal under the common law conspiracy to defraud. Rather an aggravating factor is 
required, see n 119.  
125
  Intel 13 May 2009 ( IP/09/745 and MEMO/09/235 ). 
126
  See n 13. 
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distinguish from pro-competitive behaviour,
127
 is clearly condemned by competition 
law rules
128
 and inflicts great economic harm which should be prohibited rather than 
taxed.
129
 These points are not drawn out in the legislation which, on the contrary, has 
been deliberately designed not to engage with them (see further section 4.A below). It 
would seem essential, however, that these aspects of cartel conduct should be clear, if 
a case for criminalisation is to be built and if an anti-cartel culture is to ‘evolve’ to the 
point that it is natural to view cartel activity as a serious crime.   
iii. Why are individuals but not corporations criminally liable for cartel 
conduct? 
In the US and Canada the legislator and/or enforcers have sought to draw a clear line 
between conduct subject to civil and criminal enforcement respectively. Criminal 
enforcement – against corporations and individuals - is reserved for concealed 
hardcore cartel activity. Other agreements are reviewed only in civil proceedings. In 
the UK, however, although the legislature has striven to separate and differentiate the 
criminal offence from the civil one, no line has been drawn between cartel conduct 
which is subject to criminal enforcement and conduct which is not. Rather, both 
criminal and civil enforcement is feasible and, indeed, may be required in hardcore 
cartel cases - individuals may be prosecuted criminally for their participation in a 
cartel, but the undertaking, through which the individual acted and which directly 
benefits from the offence, can only be investigated in an administrative procedure. In 
Marine Hoses, for example, the undertakings involved were fined following 
investigation by the Commission, whilst the individuals involved were prosecuted 
criminally and imprisoned.
130
 In the absence of a coherent justification for this 
difference in treatment, the ‘non-felonious villainy’ problem arises as the criminal law 
is allowed to signal moral opprobrium in a random and inconsistent fashion: the signal 
about the moral culpability of perpetrators becomes confused.  
The rationale for treating undertakings and individuals resulted from the 
Government’s desire to maintain consistency with EU law (for the undertakings) 
whilst at the same time seeking to separate the criminal offence from the civil regime 
with the objective of ensuring that its enforcement would not be compromised by 
virtue of it being characterised as ‘national competition law’ within the meaning of 
Article 3 Regulation 1/2003.
131
 Other justifications for this distinction in treatment 
might exist, however. For example, it could be argued that it is not intelligible or 
desirable to criminalise the conduct of corporations, there is no point in doing so – 
since corporations feel no shame and cannot be imprisoned, and/or that it is the 
individuals not the legal person that are, in reality, responsible for the violation.  
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Criminalisation of the conduct of corporations can, however, be intelligible and 
desirable in certain circumstances. Indeed, as corporations are systems with a culture 
that exists independently of the specific personnel in the company, corporate policy 
can be regarded as the corporation’s ‘purpose’,132 containing a synthesis and 
compromise of the views of the individuals involved. Consequently, in some cases the 
intentionality which can be said to lie behind the policy may be one more 
appropriately attributable to the company than to any particular individual or 
individuals within it.
133
 Where this is the case corporations do, arguably, possess the 
two conditions necessary for blameworthiness; the ability to make decisions and to 
fail, inexcusably, to perform an assigned task. Indeed, criminal liability may be 
required to express ‘the community’s condemnation of the wrongdoer’s conduct by 
emphasising the standards for appropriate behaviour’ and ‘defeat[ing] the 
wrongdoer’s valuation of the worth of some person or good.’134 
This also suggests that it is not possible to justify a clear allocation of criminal 
responsibility for a violation between the corporation and individual respectively. 
Rather, it reinforces the view that cartels have both a collective corporate and a human 
dimension. Although, therefore, cartel conduct could result from an individual’s 
defiance of corporate policy, and his hiding of the conduct from senior management 
and general counsel, so too could it result from a corporate culture that condones or 
encourages such behaviour – whether directly or indirectly.135 This indicates that even 
though it may be important that ‘management is sufficiently incentivised to take a 
personal interest in facilitating compliance with the company’s legal obligations’136 
and it may be questioned whether corporate sanctions alone can be effective in 
deterring cartels,
137
 the question of who should accept responsibility for the conduct 
and bear the sanctions is complex and may differ significantly from case to case.  
It seems difficult, therefore, to justify a rule which assumes that it is the individual 
alone who should be held morally culpable for a cartel infringement through criminal 
proceedings. There should be the possibility at least of treating corporations and 
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133
  See, e.g. J Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: four models of fault’ (1994) 14 Legal Studies 393, B 
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Criminology 147, 173. French (P French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1984) calls this process the CID; Corporation’s Internal Decision-
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=162549 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.162549. 
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  L Friedman, ‘In defense of corporate criminal liability’, 23 Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 
833. 
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individuals equally: ‘the allocation of individual and corporate responsibility for cartel 
conduct should not depend on whether the enforcement proceedings are civil or 
criminal’.138 This does not automatically mean that criminal liability should be 
extended to corporate acts as well, however. On the contrary,
139
 where the coherence 
of criminal law is already being stretched by expanding its reach to the conduct of 
corporations (unnatural subjects of the criminal law),
140
 even greater care should be 
taken to ensure that liability is attached only to conduct considered to be morally 
stigmatic enough to justify criminalisation.    
4. THE UK REGIME: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN 
CRIMINALISATION 
A. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS: DEFINING THE OFFENCE 
The decision to layer a criminal cartel offence on top of the administrative one has, in 
addition to the theoretical problems discussed above, created both substantive and 
procedural difficulties, which may have contributed to both a lack of clarity about the 
scope of the offence and its under-enforcement. 
As the criminal offence does not exactly mirror the civil counterpart it seeks to reflect 
and supplement, a core difficulty has been to ensure that the offence is not over-
inclusive. Although designed to apply to only a subset of agreements prohibited by 
Article 101/Chapter I CA98, the legislature has not found it easy provide a 
sufficiently clear legal definition of such activity
141
 which distinguishes the 
problematic hardcore cartel conduct targeted from conduct which is not targeted and 
which would not infringe the civil prohibition. In particular, the criminal offence is 
not designed to reach benign or pro-competitive horizontal cooperation agreements 
which might require some restrictions on the competitors’ price setting or output, for 
example: agreements amongst competitors to charge a common price in a blanket 
licence agreement for artistic works; the fixing of interchange fees in a payment 
system; syndicated bank loans and/or certain insurance underwriting.  
In some jurisdictions, the criminal legislation draws a clear distinction between these 
different types of conduct. In Canada, for example, although price-fixing, market 
allocation and output restriction agreements between competitors are illegal per se and 
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2009 
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Reform’ (February 10 2012). The Structures of the Criminal Law, Duff, Farmer, Marshall Renzo & 
Tadros, eds, 2011: University of Pennsylvania Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
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can be prosecuted criminally there is a statutory ancillary restraints defence for 
restraints which are directly related to and reasonably necessary to give effect to a 
broader or separate agreement among the parties (such agreements are reviewable 
only under the civil rules). In the UK, the Government has not wished to allow 
criminal trials to be muddied by allowing this kind of economic and efficiency criteria 
to be raised by the defendant. Rather, it has sought to ensure that the offence will not 
prohibit agreements which would be lawful under the civil rules through indirect 
means. The dishonesty requirement proved to be a poor mechanism for bridging 
weakness in the objective definition of the prohibited conduct.
142
 It also appeared that 
it was unlikely to achieve the Government’s objective of excluding economic 
evidence from criminal trials.
143
 In the debate that led up to the reform of the cartel 
offence, the Government accepted this.  
The Government will hope, therefore, that that the incorporation of exclusions, 
combined with statutory defences and prosecutorial guidance, will prove a better 
mechanism for doing so. As, however, the legislation has again approached the 
problem ‘indirectly’, and this time in an extremely formalistic manner, it is not clear 
that it will fare better. On the contrary, the language utilised in the new legislation, 
which is not familiar to competition lawyers, is already causing considerable 
turbulence in the business community and fear that the criminal offence applies too 
broadly, encompassing a number of benign ventures between competitors. 
Prosecutorial Guidance setting out when prosecution is (or is not) likely to be in the 
public interest, is unlikely to be of much immediate comfort to business-people 
concerned that they may have committed a criminal offence and about the wider 
consequences that follow from a criminal offence having been committed (for 
example, money laundering issues, the nullity of the agreement and the possibility of 
extradition), not to mention rule of law concerns with such an approach.
144
 Even if, 
therefore, the new offence is certain enough to survive the relatively un-exacting 
requirements of Article 7
145
 it seems possible that the offence will have the effect of 
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deterring the conclusion of some pro-competitive arrangements and undermining the 
Government’s objective of putting in place a competition regime for growth.  
B. PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES 
It has been seen that the co-existence of two separate civil and criminal cartel regimes 
requires one process for proceeding against legal entities and another for proceedings 
against individuals.
146
 Further, that as no coherent moral justification has been 
provided for this difference in treatment there is a danger that the message about the 
criminality of the individual’s behaviour is being undermined. Another problem is 
that the set-up is cumbersome procedurally. It requires the exercise of different 
enforcement models (one judicial and one administrative) for the different 
proceedings, the use of different enforcement powers
147
 and the exercise of extreme 
care to ensure that one process is not compromised by the other. In some 
circumstances, the criminal and administrative processes may even be handled by two 
different agencies, as was the case in Marine Hoses for example.
148
 As criminal 
investigations and proceedings are also more resource intensive than administrative 
ones and significantly more risky, enforcers may be encouraged to side-step all of 
these complications by side-lining the criminal offence
149
 and bringing administrative 
proceedings instead. In 2009, for example, the OFT did not bring criminal 
proceedings but imposed major fines on construction firms engaged in bid-rigging 
with competitors
150
 and recruitment agencies
151
 engaged in price fixing, stating that 
both cases involved serious and significant violations. These decisions ‘highlight the 
dangers of loss of credibility and compromise of deterrent impact where an 
enforcement agency describes a cartel case as serious yet gives no explanation, or an 
unconvincing explanation, for not bringing criminal proceedings’. 152 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The UK’s criminal cartel offence has not, to date, been a success and the Government 
has accepted that it has not had the deterrent effect desired. On the contrary, the 
events which have unfolded appear to confirm that dangers are inherent in the use the 
criminal law to prohibit conduct to which no pre-existing moral stigma is attached. 
Criminalisation in such circumstances risks undermining its ability to provide an 
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effective deterrent and the moral signalling function of the criminal law more 
generally. It remains to be seen whether the 2013 reforms will be sufficient to 
overcome the problems with the offence identified. It does not appear, however, that 
the Government has yet taken sufficient steps to develop an anti-cartel culture and/or 
to identify the specific features of cartel activity that might be used to build a 
consensus that moral condemnation, and criminalisation, of cartel conduct is 
warranted. In addition, the continuing existence of an overlapping administrative 
offence is liable to further weaken the force of the criminal law both by undermining 
the message about criminality that the Government is trying to create and by 
incentivising the CMA to sidestep more complex and risky criminal proceedings. 
Conversely, while it may not deter cartel activity, uncertainty about the scope of the 
new offence might chill beneficial cooperation between competitors, by leading to 
undesirable risk-aversion and to the over-commitment of firm resources in the 
avoidance of risk.  
The difficulties that have been encountered in the UK should provide salutary lessons 
for other countries considering how best to combat and to deter cartels. Indeed, given 
the significant obstacles to criminalising cartel activity identified, serious 
consideration should be given to the question of whether, alternatively, civil liability 
might be expanded to provide a more efficient and effective mechanism for increasing 
deterrence.
153
 First, concerns about sanction insufficiency could be addressed. For 
example, if corporate fines are believed to be insufficient to ensure deterrence, the 
category of actors liable under civil rules could be expanded, perhaps to encompass 
individuals directly involved
154
 (although absolute personal liability must certainly be 
un-indemnifiable and un-shiftable,
155
 this does not mean that it must be criminal in 
nature
156
) or other actors such as lawyers, underwriters, outside directors or 
accountants who possess privileged information about the company and have the 
capacity to influence firm behaviour to ensure compliance with the law (gatekeeper 
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Controls’ (1983-84) 93 Yale Law Journal 857 who identifies three circumstances in which 
corporate liability might be insufficient: asset insufficiency, where the firm cannot pay the law’s 
price for the wrong done; sanction insufficiency, when the legal system cannot charge a high 
enough price to deter (which might include situations of asset insufficiency) and enforcement 
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liability
157
). Further a broader array of civil sanctions could be considered, including 
individual fines or non-monetary sanctions such as disqualification orders and/or 
punitive injunctions for corporations.
158
 
Second, the issue of enforcement insufficiency could be addressed.
159
 Indeed, 
Becker’s research on major felonies in the US suggests that the probability of 
detection had a greater impact on the commission of (major felony) offences than the 
level of punishment.
160
 Steps could therefore be taken to encourage greater public 
enforcement, private enforcement (particularly stand-alone actions, Landes and Davis, 
for example, conclude following a study of forty successful private antitrust cases, 
that more than half the underlying violations were first uncovered by private attorneys 
rather than government enforcers
161
 and that private litigation ‘probably does more to 
deter antitrust violations than all the fines and incarceration imposed as a result of 
criminal enforcement by the DOJ’162) and to increase the probability of detection. 
Although leniency regimes are now routinely operated by antitrust enforcers, a 
broader range of actors could be drawn in. In the context of corporate fraud, for 
example, Dyck, Morse and Zingales demonstrate that actors with no residual claim in 
the firms involved, such as employees, non-financial-market regulators and the 
media,
163
 can play a key role in fraud detection. Not only do such people gather 
considerable relevant information as a by-product of their normal work, they also 
have broad range of incentives for uncovering fraud. Such incentives include 
journalistic reputation, avoidance of potential legal liability, and, crucially, monetary 
reward, see for example the Federal Civil False Claims Act, also known as the qui tam 
statute.
164
 Similar provisions are also used for the detection of tax evasion,
165
 and can 
be used in the antitrust context.
166
 
In conclusion, it seems that there are significant difficulties and obstacles involved in 
introducing an effective criminal cartel offence.  For jurisdictions considering how 
best to increase the deterrent effect of their anti-cartel rules it might, therefore, be 
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sensible to consider a full range of possible options, including whether liability should 
be individual and/or corporate, criminal and/or civil before it is concluded that 
individual criminal liability is the solution.
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